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I investigate the argument that, in a two–party system with different regulatory
objectives, political uncertainty generates regulatory risk. I show that this risk has a
fluctuation effect that hurts both parties and an output–expansion effect that benefits
one party. Consequently, at least one party dislikes regulatory risk. Moreover, both
political parties gain from eliminating regulatory risk when political divergence is small
or the winning probability of the regulatory–risk–averse party is not too large. Because
of a commitment problem, direct political bargaining is insufficient to eliminate regula-
tory risk. Politically independent regulatory agencies solve this commitment problem.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates regulatory risk that is politically motivated.1 It shows first that,
in a two–party system, diverging political preferences and electoral uncertainty does indeed
generate such risk. The analysis reveals, however, that in many circumstances both political
parties dislike this risk and, therefore, want to prevent regulatory risk actively. In particular
I show that at least one of the two parties dislikes regulatory risk, whereas the other party’s
preferences depends on a trade–off between a negative fluctuation and a positive output–
expansion effect of regulatory risk. The negative effect dominates when differences between
the parties are relatively small or when electoral uncertainty is not too much in favor of the
party that has an unambiguous dislike of regulatory risk. In such political systems, both
political parties prefer implementing the expected regulatory objective with certainty over
waiting for the uncertain election outcome. Consequently, political parties have an interest
in establishing institutions, such as political bargaining, to eliminate politically motivated
regulatory risk.
Due to a time–inconsistency problem, political bargaining by itself is, however, not an
effective institution for eliminating this risk. When both political parties have, from an ex
ante point of view, an incentive to agree on a mutual beneficial deterministic regulatory
policy, each party anticipates that, after the election, the winning political party will change
it to its most preferred one. This ex post myopic behavior undermines the credibility of an
ex ante agreement.
The paper investigates two institutions that circumvent the inherent commitment prob-
lems. First, it analyzes how cooperation based on repeated interactions can overcome the
time–inconsistency problem. Second, it argues, in line with a large literature on delegation,
that the problem is solved by institutionalizing a politically independent regulatory agency
and endowing it with an objective function on which both parties agree ex ante. The paper,
1Regulatory risk reflects the uncertainty behind new or changing regulation over time. Different surveys
on business risk agree that regulatory risk is one of the greatest threat to modern businesses. For instance,
the Ernst&Young 2008 survey on strategic business risk calls regulatory and compliance risk “the greatest
strategic challenge facing leading global businesses in 2008”. Regulators are well aware of the problem of
regulatory risk.
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therefore, provides a formal rationale for the prevalence of politically independent regulatory
agencies.2
I derive these results in the optimal incentive regulation framework of Baron and Myerson
(1982), where a government tries to regulate a privately informed monopolist with the objec-
tive to maximize a weighted sum of consumer surplus and profits.3 I embed this framework
in a political economy model, where two political parties run for election before regulating
the firm. Both parties are benevolent but differ in their views about the appropriate relative
weights in the social choice function between consumer and producer surplus. These dif-
ferent political views cause a preference for different regulatory policies. As a consequence,
political uncertainty generates regulatory risk.
I show that a party’s attitude towards regulatory risk is fully determined by a fluctuation
and an output–expansion effect. The fluctuation effect hurts both parties unambiguously,
whereas the expansion effect benefits one party, while hurting the other. As a result, at least
one party unambiguously dislikes regulatory risk, whilst the other party likes regulatory risk
when the expansion effect outweighs the fluctuation effect. Because the trade–off shifts in
favor of the fluctuation effect when the degree of political divergence is small, both parties
and, therefore, the overall political system tends to dislike regulatory risk when political
differences between the two parties is small.
2 Related Literature
The theoretical literature on regulatory risk is rather small. Chang and Thompson (1989)
analyze regulatory risk under rate of return regulation. Panteghini and Scarpa (2003) study
the effect of regulatory risk on investment by comparing price–caps to profit–sharing rules.
Both these papers compare ad–hoc regulation schemes rather than studying regulatory risk
under optimal regulation. In contrast, Strausz (2009) develops, based on uncertain regulatory
variables, an analytical framework to study regulatory risk in optimal monopoly regulation
under asymmetric information. The current paper uses a specific version of this framework.
2OECD (2002) reports that independent regulatory agencies are currently “one of the most widespread
institutions of modern regulatory governance”.
3See Armstrong and Sappington (2007) for an introduction to optimal regulation models.
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Although an extensive literature investigates the multi–faceted connections between po-
litical economy and regulation, the literature has not addressed the specific relation between
political economy and regulatory risk. Closest related is Laffont (2000), who analyzes the
welfare trade–offs between an inflexible, constitutionally fixed regulatory schedule and a
flexible schedule that reacts to changes in the marginal cost of public funds but underlies
political capture by two different consumer groups. In contrast to the current paper, Laf-
font’s framework is not cast in terms of regulatory risk.4 A further difference is that my
paper presents a positive rather than a normative analysis.
The literature on political economy is well aware of the benefits of delegation due to com-
mitment problems. To put my results in relation to this extensive literature, it is helpful to
clarify that this literature implicitly addresses two different types of commitment problems.5
First, there is the time–inconsistency of Kydland and Prescott (1977), which shows that a
decision maker is hurt when he cannot commit to its future, short run decisions. The prob-
lem here is a lack of self–commitment. Hold–up problems are examples of self–commitment
problems. Without self–commitment, the decision maker benefits from delegating future
decisions to a third party in order to bind itself.6 This motivation for delegation is however
unrelated to political uncertainty; the underlying self–commitment problem is not due to a
(possible) change of the decision maker. My framework, therefore, shares with this literature
that the benefits of delegation are due to a self–commitment problem. A crucial difference is,
however, that in my framework the self–commitment problem plays only a role when there
is political uncertainty.
The strand of the literature that explicitly connects delegation with political uncertainty
concentrates on a different commitment problem: The inability of current holder of pub-
lic authority (e.g., current voters or elected politicians) to constrain the decisions of future
holders of public authority. An extensive literature studies the implications of this commit-
ment problem (e.g., Glazer 1989, Persson and Svensson 1989, Alesina and Tabellini 1988,
4Strausz (2009) shows that stochastic changes in the marginal cost of public funds also generate regulatory
risk.
5Gilardi (2005a) examines the explanatory power of the two different types of commitment problems for
the political independence of regulatory agencies.
6A prominent example in the context of monetary policy is the argument in favor of central bank inde-
pendence (Rogoff 1985).
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1990; Tabellini and Alesina 1990). For this literature, the underlying problem is not one
of self–commitment but rather one of committing others. Moe (1990, p.229), for example,
argues that it induces current public authority holders to use delegation as “protective de-
vices for insulating agencies from political enemies”. Vogel (1996, p.131) applies this view
directly to regulation when he observes that “Thatcher administration officials favored in-
dependent regulators because of the dynamics of alternance in British politics. The party in
power wants to be able to infiltrate the bureaucracy, but by the same token wants to guard
it from future infiltration by the other party.” Although my paper shares with this litera-
ture the importance of political uncertainty, it differs in that the underlying commitment
problem which delegation helps to solve is actually a self–commitment problem rather than
committing future public authority holders.
3 The Setup
Consider a monopolistic firm that produces a publicly provided good x at a constant marginal
cost. There are no fixed costs. Given marginal costs c, the firm’s profit from producing a
quantity x for a lump–sum transfer t is
Π(t, x|c) ≡ t− cx.
Marginal costs are cl with probability ν and ch with probability 1−ν, where ∆c ≡ ch−cl > 0.
The firm, however, is perfectly informed about its marginal costs c.
When consumers pay a lump–sum transfer t in exchange for the consumption of a quantity
x, they obtain the consumer surplus
Ψ(t, x) ≡ v(x) − t.
The term v(x) expresses the consumers’ overall utility from the consumption of a quantity x
of the good. I follow the standard assumption that consumer’s marginal utility of the good
x is positive but decreasing, i.e., v′ > 0 and v′′ < 0. Moreover, I assume that v′′′ exists, but
make no assumptions about its sign. Because v′ represents the consumers’ (inverse) aggre-
gate demand function, the third derivative v′′′ determines the curvature of the consumers’
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aggregate demand function.7 As a consequence, the demand function is convex exactly when
v′′′ is non–negative. The regulatory framework is similar to Strausz (2009), which provides
the insight that the curvature of the demand function plays a crucial role in how regulatory
risk affects regulatory outcomes.
Before regulation takes place, there is a general election between a party l and a party
r. The election determines the ruling party that runs the government and, ultimately,
decides about the regulation. I assume that the election exhibits some randomness which,
for simplicity, I take as exogenous: Party r wins the election with probability α ∈ (0, 1) and
party l wins it with probability 1 − α.8 After the election, the winning party’s task is to
regulate the monopolistic firm.
I assume that both parties are benevolent in that they maximize a social choice function
W that is a weighted sum of the consumer surplus and the firm’s profits:
W = Ψ + λΠ, (1)
where the parameter λ ∈ [0, 1) represents the weight attached to profits. One interpretation
is that the two parties differ in their perception of the appropriate weight λ in society’s social
choice function. Without loss of generality, I assume that the party r has a more business
friendly orientation so that ∆λ ≡ λr − λl > 0. In particular, a firm that receives a transfer
t and produces a quantity x at marginal costs ci yields party p ∈ {l, r} a payoff of
Wp(x, t, ci) ≡ Ψ(x, t) + λpΠ(x, t) = v(x) − λpcix+ (1 − λp)t.
To summarize, the triple (α, λl, λr) describes the political system. For a given political
system, I define ∆λ ≡ λr − λl as the measure of political divergence of the system.
7The consumer’s demand x(p) solves maxx v(x) − px and satisfies the first order condition v′(x(p)) =
p. By the implicit function theorem, differentiating twice and rearranging terms yields x′′(p) =
−v′′′(x(p))x′(p)2/v′′(x(p)).
8In principle, α could be determined by a more elaborate political economy model. The crucial assumption
is that there is at least some uncertainty about the election outcome so that α ∈ (0, 1). This obtains, for
instance, when the preferences of the electorate exhibit some randomness or when the outcome of the elections
depend on other uncertain political issues than the regulatory problem alone. Essentially, the model takes
seriously that elections in real life always have at least some degree of uncertainty.
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4 Optimal Regulation
In this section, I calculate the optimal regulatory schedule for a given social choice function
W . From the revelation principle, it follows that the optimal regulation contract is a direct
mechanism (tl, xl, th, xh) that gives the firm an incentive to report its true cost type ci.




νWp(xl, tl, cl) + (1 − ν)Wp(xh, th, ch) (2)
s.t. th − chxh ≥ tl − chxl and tl − clxl ≥ th − clxh (3)
tl ≥ clxl and th ≥ chxh, (4)
where (3) represents the incentive compatibility conditions that ensure truthtelling and (4)
represents the firm’s participation constraints and reflect the implicit assumption that both
types of firm are required to operate.
As is well known, only the incentive compatibility of the efficient firm cl and the individual
rationality constraint of the inefficient firm ch are binding. Solving for these two constraints
yields the transfers th = chxh and tl = clxl + ∆cxh. Substituting out the transfers, problem
P simplifies to maximizing the expression
W̃p(xl, xh) ≡ ν[v(xl) − clxl − (1 − λp)∆cxh] + (1 − ν)[v(xh) − chxh]
with respect to the quantities xl and xh.
The first order conditions that characterize the optimal quantity schedules (x̂l, x̂h) are
v′(x̂l) = cl and v
′(x̂h) = ch + (1 − λ)ψ∆c, (5)
where ψ ≡ ν/(1 − ν). Hence, we obtain the standard result that the allocation of the
efficient type coincides with the first best and the allocation of the inefficient type is distorted
downwards. Consequently, only the output x̂h depends on the parameter λ.
The optimal regulatory schedule for a given profit–weight λ yields party p the payoff
Ŵp(λ) ≡ W̃p(x̂l, x̂h(λ)).
The following lemma confirms the intuitive but helpful property that Ŵp attains a maximum
at λp.
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Lemma 1 The function Ŵp is increasing for λ < λp and decreasing for λ > λp. It attains
a unique maximum at λp so that Ŵ
′
p(λp) = 0 and Ŵ
′′
p (λp) < 0.






Due to v′′ < 0, the derivative x̂′h(λ) is positive and, therefore, x̂h(λl) ≤ x̂h(λr) ≤ xfbh . This
illustrates the intuitive result that the more business friendly party r asks the firm to produce
more. The explanation is that more production leads, due to higher information rent, to
higher profits, which party r discounts less than party l.






The expression shows that the sign of x̂′′h(λ) coincides with the sign of v
′′′. Because v′′′ rep-
resents the curvature of the consumer’s demand function, the schedule x̂h(λ) is convex when
the consumer’s demand is convex. If the demand function is concave, then the schedule x̂(λ)
is concave. Strausz (2009) shows that this one–to–one relationship between the curvature of
the demand function and the regulatory schedule holds more generally and is not particular
to the binary character of asymmetric information.
5 Regulatory Risk
Electorial uncertainty implies that the high cost firm will produce output x̂h(λr) with prob-
ability α and the output x̂h(λl) with probability 1 − α. Hence, uncertain elections generate
uncertain regulation outcomes and, therefore, regulatory risk. Due to this risk, the ex ante
expected payoff of party p is
W ep (α) ≡ αŴp(λr) + (1 − α)Ŵp(λl). (8)
In this section, I ask the question how political parties evaluate the regulatory risk and
whether they have incentives to reduce or even eliminate it. Following the standard approach
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towards risk attitudes, I say that a political party dislikes regulatory risk when its expected
payoff with the risk is smaller than its payoff under its expected policy preference9
λe(α) ≡ αλr + (1 − α)λl.
According to this definition, a political party p dislikes regulatory risk in a political system
(α, λl, λr) exactly when
Ŵp(λe(α)) ≥W ep (α). (9)
In contrast, a party likes regulatory risk when the inequality is reversed. Consequently, the
curvature of Ŵp determines party p’s attitude towards risk. In particular, party p dislikes
regulatory risk, when its payoff Ŵp is concave in λ. In contrast, the political party likes the
risk, when its payoff function Ŵp is convex. The following lemma establishes a sufficient
condition under which a party’s payoff Ŵp is concave around λ.
Lemma 2 The function Ŵp(λ) is concave around λ when
(λp − λ)ψ∆cv′′′(x̂h(λ)) < [v′′(x̂h(λ))]2. (10)
When the local condition (10) holds globally, the function Ŵp(λ) is concave globally,
which implies that party p dislikes regulatory risk in general. Because the expected policy
preference λe lies in between λl and λr, the relevant interval for considering the curvature
of Ŵp(λ) is [λl, λr] rather than the overall domain [0, 1]. For λ ∈ [λl, λr], all the signs of the
different terms in (10) are unambiguously determined except for v′′′. We, therefore, obtain
the following insights about the parties’ risk preferences.
Proposition 1 When demand is globally concave (v′′′ < 0), party r dislikes regulatory risk.
When demand is globally convex (v′′′ > 0), party l dislikes regulatory risk. For linear demand
(v′′′ = 0), both parties dislike regulatory risk.
Proposition 1 follows directly from Lemma 2, because inequality (10) is closely related
to the curvature of the demand function. Hence, if the sign of the curvature does not
9Hence, the uncertain distribution α is a mean preserving spread of the degenerated distribution λe(α)
in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).
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change then, for a specific party, inequality (10) holds globally. Proposition 1 is, however,
uninformative about risk preferences for demand curves with a changing sign of curvature.
For such demand functions, the local effect of regulatory risk can change over the relevant
domain [λl, λr] and we have to consider the overall global effect of regulatory risk directly. In
order to show that the effect of regulatory risk depends on the expected value of the output
xh, define x̂
e
h as the expected output under regulatory risk:
x̂eh(α) ≡ αx̂h(λr) + (1 − α)x̂h(λl).
The next lemma shows that if the expected output under regulatory risk is smaller than
the output under the expected policy weight λe, party r dislikes regulatory risk. Contrary,
party l dislikes regulatory risk, when the expected output under regulatory risk is larger
than the output under the expected policy weight λe.
Lemma 3 If x̂eh(α) ≤ x̂h(λe(α)), then party r dislikes regulatory risk. If x̂eh(α) ≥ x̂h(λe(α)),
then party l dislikes regulatory risk.
From the previous lemma it follows that, independent of the demand curve, at least one
political party dislikes regulatory risk.
Proposition 2 In any political system (α, λl, λr) there exists at least one political party that
dislikes regulatory risk.
Although Proposition 2 tells us that at least one party dislikes regulatory risk, it does
not tell us which of the two parties this actually is. To address this question, observe
that Proposition 1 suggests that the curvature of the demand function, v′′′, plays a crucial
role. The intuition is that regulatory risk has two distinct effects: a fluctuation effect and
an output expansion-contraction effect. I now argue that the sign of the fluctuation effect
is unambiguously negative, whereas the sign of the second effect depends exactly on the
curvature of the demand function.
First, with regulatory risk output fluctuates between x̂h(λl) and x̂h(λr). Because of the
consumers’ decreasing marginal utility, benevolent parties dislike such fluctuations. Hence,
this first effect leads to an unambiguous dislike of regulatory risk. Indeed, for linear demand,
regulatory risk has no additional effect and the fluctuation effect of regulatory risk fully
10
Concave demand v′′′ < 0
λl λrλ̃
l likes riskl dislikes risk
Ŵl(λ)
Ŵr(λ)





r likes risk r dislikes risk
Figure 1: Non–concave payoff functions
explains the result of Proposition 1 that, with linear demand, both parties dislike regulatory
risk.
When demand is not linear, regulatory risk has a second effect in that it also affects
the expected value of the output itself. With convex demand, v′′′ > 0, the output x̂h(λ) is
convex so that regulatory risk leads to an expansion in output (x̂eh > x̂h(λe)). Because party
l considers the output x̂h(λe) already as too high (x̂h(λl) < x̂h(λe)), this output expansion
effect of regulatory risk hurts party l. Hence, both effects reinforce each other and cause
party l to dislike regulatory risk. In contrast, the output expanding effect benefits party r,
because x̂h(λe) lies below its ideal value x̂h(λr). Hence, the second effect contradicts the first
effect and when demand is convex enough, the positive output expansion effect outweighs
the negative fluctuation effect of regulatory risk.
The opposite logic holds when demand is concave (v′′′ < 0). In this case, the output
x̂h(λ) is concave so that regulatory risk leads to a contraction of output in expected terms.
For party r, the contraction reinforces the negative fluctuation effect. For party l, however,
the contraction is beneficial and, therefore, contradicts the fluctuation effect.
Figure 1 illustrates the role of curvature further. When demand is concave (v′′′ < 0),
condition (10) is, due to the output contraction effect, satisfied for any λ < λp. This implies
that the curve Ŵp is concave for all weights λ that are smaller than the party’s ideal weight
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λp. As illustrated in the first graph of Figure 1, this implies for party r that its payoff
function Ŵr is concave for the entire range [λl, λr]. For λ > λp, a party p benefits from the
output contraction effect and, for λ large enough, condition (10) is, therefore, violated. As
illustrated in the first graph of Figure 1, this implies that there exist a range of [λ̃, λr] such
that party l actually likes regulatory risk. The graph indicates that his happens in political
systems (α, λl, λr), where political divergence, ∆λ, is large and political uncertainty is small
in that α is close to 1.
The reverse logic holds when demand is convex. In this case, regulatory risk has an
output expansion effect, which hurts a party p for λ > λp and benefits it for λ < λp. As a
result, the curve Ŵp is concave for any λ > λp but not necessarily for λ < λp. Consequently,
party l dislikes regulatory risk for any expected weight λe, whereas party r likes regulatory
risk when the political divergence, ∆λ, is large enough and α is close to zero so that λe lies
close to λl. In the second graph of Figure 1, this is exactly the case for the range [λl, λ̃].
Proposition 2 reveals that at least one political party dislikes regulatory risk, but Figure
1 illustrates that the other party may or may not like it. I next characterize political systems
in which both parties dislike regulatory risk. I define such systems as political systems that
are averse to regulatory risk.
Because the curve Ŵp(λ) reaches, by definition, its maximum at λp, it is necessarily
concave at λp. Hence, a party’s social choice function Ŵp(λ) is concave for weights λ close
to the party’s ideal weight λp. This reasoning suggests that a party’s payoff tends to be
concave over the whole range [λl, λr] when this range is small. Hence, the degree of political
divergence, ∆λ, seems to play an important role in determining the risk attitude of political






This definition leads to the following result.
10If v′′′(x) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, x̂h(1)], then λ̄ = ∞.
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Proposition 3 A political system (α, λl, λr) is averse to regulatory risk whenever political
divergence ∆λ is small and, in particular, smaller than λ̄.
According to Lemma 3 at least one party dislikes the regulatory risk. When we denote
this party as the regulatory risk averse party, it follows that the other party dislikes regulatory
risk when the winning probability of this party is not too large. This leads to the following
result.
Proposition 4 A political system (α, λl, λr) is averse to regulatory risk whenever the win-
ning probability of the regulatory risk averse party is small enough.
The proposition shows that a sufficient condition for a political system to be regulatory
risk averse is that the party that is not regulatory risk averse is likely enough to win. This
implies that a necessary condition for this party to like regulatory risk is that it is relatively
unlikely to win the election. At first sight this may seem surprising, but Figure 1 illustrates
the intuition behind the result. When the party that may potentially prefer regulatory risk
is likely to win, its payoff function is necessarily concave around the expected value λe.
Therefore, also this party has a tendency to dislike regulatory risk.
6 Pre–electoral Bargaining
When the political system is averse to regulatory risk, it has an interest in eliminating it.
One way of doing so is to institutionalize a procedure of pre–electoral bargaining which allows
political parties to write binding agreements about future regulation before the election
takes place. In political systems that are averse to regulatory risk, efficient pre–electoral
bargaining leads to an elimination of regulatory risk, because the political parties themselves
strictly benefit from regulating the firm on the basis of the expected regulatory variable λe
rather than waiting for the uncertain election outcome. General pre–electoral bargaining
procedures may, however, also allow and lead to agreements on other regulatory variables
than the expectation λe. It raises the question from which regulatory variables λ both parties
potentially benefit. This section concentrates on this more general question. For a given
political system, it fully characterizes the set of deterministic regulatory variables λ from
which both parties benefit.
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Figure 2: Mutual beneficial pre–electoral agreements Λ(α)
In order to characterize the set of beneficial regulatory variables, it is helpful to consider
the regulatory variable λp(α) for which a party p is indifferent between the stochastic outcome
under regulatory risk and regulating the firm on the basis of the deterministic regulatory




Because Ŵp is monotone on the interval [λl, λr] and W
e
p lies in between Ŵp(λl) and Ŵp(λr),
the value λp(α) exists and is unique.
Because Ŵl is decreasing on [λl, λr], it follows that party l strictly prefers regulation
on the basis of any λ < λl(α) to the regulatory risk outcome. Similarly, party r strictly
prefers regulation on the basis of any λ > λr(α) to the regulatory risk outcome. Hence,
if λr(α) < λl(α) then for any λ ∈ (λr(α), λl(α)) both parties prefer it to the regulatory
risk outcome. The first graph in Figure 2 illustrates the construction of Λ(α) in the case
where both parties dislike regulatory risk. The second graph illustrates the case where one
party actually likes regulatory risk. In both cases, λr(α) > λl(α) so that a non–empty set
of beneficial regulatory variables exists. Yet, if λr(α) > λl(α) then there does not exist a
mutual beneficial λ. We, therefore, obtain the following results.
Proposition 5 In a political system (α, λl, λr) pre–electoral agreement is potentially bene-
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ficial if and only if λr(α) < λl(α). In this case, it is beneficial for any λ ∈ Λ(α) with
Λ(α) ≡ (λr(α), λl(α)) .
For a political system that is averse to regulatory risk, we have, as illustrated in the first
graph of Figure 2, λe ∈ Λ(α). Hence, in such political systems the set Λ(α) is non–empty
and, in general, not a singleton. Proposition 5 shows moreover that the parties also benefit
from regulating on the basis from other regulatory variables than the expected value λe.
A common dislike of regulatory risk is, therefore, a sufficient condition for the existence of
beneficial pre–electoral agreements but, as illustrated in the second graph of Figure 2, not a
necessary one. In this case, beneficial pre–electoral agreements may exist even if regulating
on the basis of the expected value λe is not mutually beneficial.
Clearly, within the set Λ(α), the two parties have diverging preferences. In particular,
party l prefers λr(α) whereas party r prefers λl(α). It then depends on the relative bargaining
strengths and the specific bargaining procedure which λ ∈ Λ(α) the parties will agree on.
7 Commitment Problems
If pre–electoral agreements are potentially beneficial, then both political parties prefer regu-
lating the firm on the basis of some deterministic policy variable λ ∈ Λ(α) to waiting for the
uncertain election outcome. Under efficient bargaining, one may, therefore, expect the po-
litical parties to eliminate the regulatory risk problem by agreeing on a deterministic policy
variable λa ∈ Λ(α) before the election.
A problem is, however, that, after the election, the winning party p has an incentive to
implement a regulatory schedule that is based on its preferred policy variable λp. Hence,
even though parties have an incentive to agree to some deterministic policy variable λ before
the election, the winning party wants to change it after the election. Such ex post changes
undermine the pre–electoral agreement and make them non–credible. The political sys-
tem, therefore, faces a commitment problem that undermines the implementation of mutual
beneficial agreements.
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In this section, I study and compare two institutions by which political parties can over-
come the commitment problem. The first institution is cooperation by repeated interaction.
I thereby follow the approach of De Figueiredo (2002). The second institution is delegation.
The section identifies and compares the circumstances under which these two institutions
sustain pre–electoral agreements despite the commitment problem.
To study the viability of the first institution, I consider an infinite super game with
stage games that coincide with the static regulation game of the previous section. Hence,
each period starts with an election that determines the winning party, which then chooses
the regulatory variable λ by which to regulate the firm. The period ends with each party
receiving its payoff based on the chosen regulatory variable λ. Between periods, these period
payoffs are discounted with a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
Following De Figueiredo (2002), I study the power of grim trigger strategies to sustain
cooperation at a policy variable λa in the repeated game. These strategies describe the
following behavior of a political party p. If a political party p wins the election, it regulates
on the basis of the pre–electoral agreement λa if the firm has been regulated on the basis
of λa in all previous periods. As soon as, some party choose some other policy parameter
λ′ 6= λa, the political party p will regulate on the basis of its myopically preferred regulatory
variable λp. When these strategies are mutually best responses, they form an equilibrium
and, despite the commitment problem, establish the cooperative outcome λa.











1 − δ .
Instead of cooperating and choose λa, a political party can, after winning the election,
implement its most preferred policy λp. This yields a period–payoff Ŵp(λp). After this
defecting behavior, the grim trigger strategy leads also the other party to pick its most
preferred policy so that period–payoffs are from then onW ep . Hence, the payoff from defecting
and choosing λp instead of λ
a yields party p




δtW ep = Ŵp(λp) + δ
W ep
1 − δ .
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By the single deviation principle, it then follows that the grim trigger strategies form an
equilibrium exactly when
W cl (λ
a) ≥W dl and W cr (λa) ≥W dr .
Let λ̄p(δ) ∈ [λl, λr] satisfy the relation11
Ŵp(λ̄p(δ)) = (1 − δ)Ŵp(λp) + δW ep .
In particular, we have λ̄p(1) = λp(α).
Proposition 6 In a political system (α, λl, λr), pre–electorial agreement on the policy vari-
able λa is sustainable with repeated cooperation if and only if λ̄r(δ) ≤ λ̄l(δ) and
λa ∈ Λ̄(δ) ≡ [λ̄r(δ), λ̄l(δ)].
The proposition shows that the set of sustainable pre–electoral agreements is Λ̄(δ). Con-
sistent with the theory of repeated games, the size and non–emptiness of this set depends
on the discount factor δ. In particular, the set is monotone decreasing in δ in the sense that
if 0 < δ1 < δ2 ≤ 1 then Λ̄(δ1) ⊂ Λ̄(δ2). Moreover, Λ̄(1) = Λ(α), which implies that any λa
in the interior of Λ(α) is sustainable with repeated actions when the discount factor is close
enough to one.
Figure 3 illustrates the construction of Λ̄(δ). It illustrates that, for δ = 1, the set
coincides with Λ(α) and illustrates how it shrinks when δ becomes smaller and vanishes
for some critical δ̄ > 0. We can regard the associated policy variable λ̄ as the most stable
pre–electoral agreement of the political system.
Proposition 7 In a political system (α, λl, λr), the minimum discount factor that is re-
quired for sustainable pre–electoral agreements δ̄ satisfies λ̄l(δ̄) = λ̄r(δ̄). The most stable
pre–electoral agreement λ̄ equals λ̄l(δ̄).
11Existence and uniqueness of λ̄l(δ) is guaranteed, because Ŵp is monotone and max{Ŵp(λl), Ŵp(λr)} ≥









Figure 3: Sustainable pre–electoral agreements Λ̄(δ)
The most stable pre–electoral agreement, λ̄ depends on the political system and, in
particular, on the electoral probability α. A question that naturally arises is which electoral
probability α yields the lowest critical discount factor δ̄. In contrary to the framework of De
Figueiredo (2002), this lowest critical discount factor does generally not obtain for α = 1/2
where electoral uncertainty is maximal.12
When the discount factor is too low and, in particular, lower than δ̄(α) then repeated
interactions are not strong enough to circumvent the commitment problem. This leads us
to consider a second institutional arrangement, which the literature commonly views as
an attempt to circumvent time–inconsistency problems: delegation. Indeed, the political
parties could create a politically independent institution and give it the responsibility to
regulate the firm on the basis of some policy variable λa. Indeed, in practise regulation is
often institutionalized and delegated to independent regulatory agencies that have a mandate
which extends beyond the electoral cycle. The commitment problem and a dislike of political
parties for regulatory risk offer an explanation of this practise.
Corollary 1 For δ < δ̄(α), the political system has an interest in institutionalizing a po-
litically independent regulatory agency in order to circumvent a commitment problem and
reduce regulatory risk in a credible way.




The corollary provides a formal explanation for the observation that independent regu-
latory agencies are currently “one of the most widespread institutions of modern regulatory
governance” (OECD 2002). The result is also consistent with the empirical observation
that regulatory agencies tend to be more independent in countries where there is frequent
turnover between governments with different preferences (Gilardi 2005a, p.141 and Gilardi
2005b).
The literature that explains delegation on the basis of commitment problems exhibits
a logical tension, because it effectively assumes that commitment by delegation is easier to
achieve than direct commitment. In my context, for instance, Corollary 1 presumes that
it is possible for political parties to commit not to interfere with the regulatory agency
but they can, due to the small discount rate, not commit to direct agreements between
them. The literature on delegation provides no rigorous arguments why this should be the
case. Nevertheless, empirical observations strongly suggest that commitment by delegation
is easier to sustain than direct agreements. Corollary 1 follows from these observations.
Moreover, the literature is also aware that there is a difference between formal and actual
independence of regulatory agencies. Gilardi (2004) measures the degree of independence
for different regulatory agencies in different countries.
8 Conclusion and Discussion
Regulatory risk affects political parties through a fluctuation and an output–expansion effect.
The fluctuation effect hurts both parties, whereas exactly one party benefits from the output–
expansion effect. When the negative fluctuation effect dominates, regulatory risk hurt both
parties. This is the case when the political divergence between the two parties is not too
large or when the probability of the party who benefits from the output–expansion effect is
small enough. In this case, political parties have an incentive to reduce regulatory risk. Due
to self–commitment problems, the parties may have a further incentive to delegate regulation
to an independent regulatory agency.
The insights of this paper are general, because the analysis identifies the two driving
effects of regulatory risk. This suggests, in particular, that similar results also hold when
regulatory risk is generated by something else than political uncertainty. Moreover, also when
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regulatory risk is, as suggested in Strausz (2009), due to uncertainty about the marginal costs
of public funds, the two identified effects determine the parties’ preferences with respect to
regulatory risk. The analysis, therefore, yields the general insight that political parties have
no unambiguous interest in generating regulatory risk artificially. Hence, even if independent
regulatory agencies are created for different reasons than for a lack of commitment, political
parties still have an incentive to endow the agency with a robust, stable objective function
that minimizes regulatory risk.
I considered a setup where political parties are unable to use direct side payments to
facilitate bargaining. If one allows such side payments then efficient bargaining leads to
a regulation on the basis of a regulatory variable λ∗lr that maximizes the common surplus
Ŵlr(λ) ≡ Ŵl(λ) + Ŵh(λ). It is straightforward to see that the common surplus function
is equivalent to twice the surplus function Ŵp(λ) that obtains from an individual party p
with the weight λp = (λl + λr)/2. It is then immediate that λ
∗
lr = (λl + λr)/2. Therefore,
also with side payments political parties have an incentive to eliminate the regulatory risk
that political uncertainty generates. The result is even stronger, because it is independent
of whether the common surplus function Wlr(λ) is concave or convex. It follows because,
by Lemma 1, the common surplus function has a unique maximum. Yet, in the context of
political economy, the assumption of efficient side payments seems inappropriate. For this
reason the analysis concentrated on the case without transferable utility.
Appendix








From (5) it follows
v′′(x̂h)∂x̂h/∂λ = −ψ∆c
so that, due to v′′ < 0, we have ∂x̂h/∂λ > 0. The sign of Ŵ
′
p(λ), therefore, coincides with
the sign of ∂W̃p/∂xh(x̂h). Note that
∂W̃p
∂xh
(x̂h) = −ν(1−λp)∆c+(1−ν)(v′(x̂h)−ch) = −ν(1−λp)∆c+(1−ν)(ψ∆c) = (λp−λ)∆c.
20
Hence, ∂W̃p/∂xh(x̂h) and, therefore, Ŵ
′
p is positive for λ < λp and negative for λ > λp. This
shows that Ŵp(λ) is increasing for λ < λp and decreasing for λ > λp. Consequently, Ŵp
attains a unique maximum at λp. Because Ŵp is twice differentiable it holds Ŵ
′
p(λp) = 0
and Ŵ ′′p (λp) < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: The function Ŵp(λ) is concave around λ if Ŵp(λ) is concave with
respect to some interval [λ, λ] around λ. A sufficient condition for this is that Ŵ ′′p (λ) < 0.
We have
Ŵp(λ) = ν[v(x̂l) − clx̂l − (1 − λp)∆cx̂h(λ)] + (1 − ν)[v(x̂h(λ)) − chx̂h(λ)].
Using (5), differentiation of Wp(.) yields
Ŵ ′p(λ) = −ν(1 − λp)∆cx̂′h(λ) + (1 − ν)[v′(x̂h(λ)) − ch]x̂′h(λ)
= −ν(1 − λp)∆cx̂′h(λ) + (1 − ν)(1 − λ)ψ∆cx̂′h(λ).
Using the definition of ψ, (6), and (7), a further differentiation of Wp(.) yields
Ŵ ′′p (λ) = [−ν(1 − λp)∆cx̂′′h(λ) + (1 − ν)(1 − λ)ψ∆cx̂′′h(λ)] − (1 − ν)ψ∆cx̂′h(λ)
= (λp − λ)ν∆cx̂′′h(λ) − (1 − ν)ψ∆cx̂′h(λ)









Hence, Ŵ ′′p (λ) < 0 exactly when
(λp − λ)ψ∆cv′′′(x̂h(λ)) < [v′′(x̂h(λ))]2.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: For the special case where demand is convex (v′′′ > 0) it follows,
for any λ ∈ (λl, λr), that (λl − λ)ψ∆cv′′′(x) < 0 < (v′′(x))2. Hence, inequality (10) is
satisfied so that Ŵl(λ) is concave and, therefore, W̃
e
l is smaller than Ŵl(αλr + (1−α)λl) for
any α ∈ (0, 1).
For the special case where demand is concave (v′′′ < 0), it follows, for any λ ∈ (λl, λr),
that (λr − λ)ψ∆cv′′′(x) < 0 < (v′′(x))2. Hence, inequality (10) is satisfied so that Ŵr(λ) is
concave and, therefore, W̃ er is smaller than Ŵr(αλr + (1 − α)λl) for any α ∈ (0, 1).
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For the linear demand case (v′′′ = 0), we have x̂eh = x̂h(λe). I showed that, for this case,
both party r and party l dislike regulatory risk. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: It follows
W er − Ŵr(λe) = αŴr(λr) + (1 − α)Ŵr(λl) − Ŵr(λe)
= αW̃r(x̂l, x̂h(λr)) + (1 − α)W̃r(x̂l, x̂h(λl)) − W̃r(x̂l, x̂h(λe))
=
[






h) − W̃r(x̂l, x̂h(λe))
]





h) − W̃r(x̂l, x̂h(λe))
]
.
Due to v′′ < 0, the first term in squared brackets is negative. The second term in square
brackets is non–positive, because x̂eh ≤ xh(λe) < x̂h(λr) and ∂W̃r/∂xh > 0 for xh < xh(λr)
imply W̃r(x̂l, x̂
e
h) ≤ W̃r(x̂l, x̂h(λe). As a result the overall expression is negative and, there-
fore, party r dislikes regulatory risk.
Similarly for party l, it follows





h) − W̃l(x̂l, x̂h(λe))
]
.
Due to v′′ < 0, the first term in squared brackets is negative. The second term in square
brackets is non–positive, because x̂eh ≥ xh(λe) > x̂h(λl) and ∂W̃l/∂xh < 0 for xh < xh(λl)
imply W̃l(x̂l, x̂
e
h) ≤ W̃l(x̂l, x̂h(λe). As a result the overall expression is negative and, therefore,
party l dislikes regulatory risk. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: If party l likes regulatory risk then, by Lemma 3, x̂eh < x̂h(λe),
but party r then, by Lemma 3, dislikes regulatory risk. Similarly, if party r likes regulatory
risk then, by Lemma 3, x̂eh > x̂h(λe), but party l then, by Lemma 3, dislikes regulatory risk.
Hence, we cannot have that both parties like regulatory risk and if some party likes risk then
the other party dislikes it. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: We show that for ∆λ < λ̄ condition (10) is satisfied for any
λ ∈ (λl, λr) so that Ŵp(λ) is concave for the whole interval [λl, λr].
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Consider first party r: For any α ∈ (0, 1), it follows
(λr − λe)ψ∆cv′′′(x̂h(λe)) = (1 − α)∆λψ∆cv′′′(x̂h(λ)) ≤ (1 − α)∆λψ∆c|v′′′(x̂h(λ))| ≤





A similar result holds for party l: For any α ∈ (0, 1), it follows 0 < λl < λe < λr < 1 and
therefore
(λl − λe)ψ∆cv′′′(x̂h(λe)) = −α∆λψ∆cv′′′(x̂h(λ)) ≤ |α∆λψ∆cv′′′(x̂h(λ))| =






Hence, for ∆λ < λ̄ both Ŵl(λ) and Ŵr(λ) are concave over the interval [λl, λr]. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: First, suppose party l is a regulatory risk averse party. Be-
cause Wr(λr) > Wr(λl), the expression W
e
r (α) is strictly decreasing in α and, in particular,
W er























because Ŵ ′r(λr) = 0. Because Ŵr(λe(1)) = W
e
r (1), it then follows that Ŵr(λe(α)) > W
e
r (α)
for α < 1 but close enough to 1.
If party l is not a regulatory risk averse party, then, by Lemma 3, party r is regulatory
risk averse. By a similar argument, one can then show that dŴl(λe(0))/dα = 0. Because
W el (α) is strictly increasing in α, it then follows that Ŵl(λe(α)) > W
e
l (α) for α > 0 but close
enough to 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: Lemma 1 shows that Ŵl is decreasing on [λl, λr]. Hence, Ŵl(λ) >
Ŵl(λl(α)) = W
e
l if and only if λ < λl(α). Similarly, Ŵr(λ) > Ŵr(λr(α)) = W
e
r if and only if
λ > λr(α), because Ŵr is increasing on [λl, λr]. Hence, Ŵl(λ) > W
e
l and Ŵr(λ) > W
e
r if and
only if λ ∈ Λ(α). Therefore, pre–electoral agreement is potentially beneficial if and only if
Λ(α) is not empty which is equivalent to λr(α) < λl(α). Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 6: Cooperation at λa is an equilibrium with the specified grim
trigger strategies exactly when W cp (λ
a) ≥W dp for both p ∈ {l, r}. It holds
W cp (λ
a) ≥W dp ⇔
Ŵp(λ
a)
1 − δ ≥ Ŵp(λp) + δ
W ep
1 − δ ⇔ Ŵp(λ
a) ≥ (1 − δ)Ŵp(λp) + δW ep . (12)
Let
W̄p(δ) ≡ (1 − δ)Ŵp(λp) + δW ep
so that
Ŵp(λ̄p(δ)) = W̄p(δ).
Because Ŵl is decreasing on [λl, λr], it follows that (12) with p = l holds for any λ
a ≤ λ̄l(δ).
Likewise, (12) with p = r holds for any λa ≥ λ̄r(δ). Hence, cooperation is an equilibrium
exactly when λ̄r(δ) ≤ λa ≤ λ̄l(δ). Q.E.D.
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